Background: Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated associations between delusions in
Introduction
Delusions represent a defining symptom of psychotic disorders (Breier & Berg, 1999; McKay et al., 2007) . Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that within the general population approximately 5-6% of individuals without psychiatric disorders endorse beliefs similar to the delusions experienced by patients with psychotic illnesses (Freeman, 2006; van Os et al., 2009) . While the majority of people with subclinical psychotic symptoms are unlikely to develop full-blown psychosis (Dominguez et al., 2011) , recent epidemiological studies suggest that delusion-like beliefs may be on an etiological continuum with delusions in psychotic disorders. For example, subclinical delusions share common risk factors with clinical delusions, such as urban living, social isolation, and depression (van Os et al., 2000) . Also, a recent longitudinal study showed that childhood internalizing and externalizing problems are associated with a higher incidence in early adulthood of both: 1) subclinical delusions, and 2) non-affective psychosis (Scott et al., 2009) . Additionally, one study found that delusion severity in patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder predicted greater levels of delusional thinking in the patients' non-ill, first-degree relatives (Schürhoff et al., 2003) , suggesting that genetic vulnerability to delusions and clinical psychosis is expressed as aberrant beliefs in otherwise healthy individuals. These results support the possibility that some of the delusional thinking observed in non-clinical samples arises from the same pathophysiological mechanisms associated with delusions in psychotic disorders.
Because delusions frequently involve misunderstandings of social situations (e.g., persecutory delusions) or of the person's position in the world relative to others (e.g., grandiose or religious delusions), it has been proposed that basic neurocognitive processes supporting the perception of the self and others (i.e., "social reflection") may be disrupted during the formation and maintenance of delusions Blackwood et al., 2001) . Consistent with this theory, several studies have demonstrated associations between delusions in schizophrenia and impairments of the capacity for understanding the mental states of others ("theory of mind") (Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Langdon et al., 1997) . Moreover, delusional thinking in the general population has been linked to a reduced ability to take an external perspective on one's own thinking (Warman & Martin, 2006 ) and a heightened self-focus when reasoning about social situations (Galbraith et al., 2008) . The neural basis of these abnormalities, however, is not yet understood.
Investigating the neural correlates of deficits of social reflection in psychopathology has become more feasible recently because the neural systems mediating social perception have been characterized to some extent in healthy populations. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies in healthy subjects have consistently shown that thinking about the self (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011; Kelley et al., 2002; Schmitz et al., 2004) and other people (Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) engages midline cortical structures (medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)), as well as the lateral temporal cortex (LTC). The involvement of these areas in social reflection is typically manifested by increased activity of these brain regions during the performance of tasks involving the retrieval of information about the self and/or others, compared to tasks focusing on general semantic or physical features of the stimuli (Amodio & Frith, 2006) . Importantly, these same midline and lateral cortical regions show elevated activity Raichle et al., 2001) and increased functional coupling (Greicius et al., 2003;  regions of this "default mode" network, including those showing aberrant activity during social reflection (Holt et al., 2011a; Murphy et al., 2010) , have been reported (Bluhm et al., 2007; Garrity et al., 2007; Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009) .
Consistent with the idea that abnormal neural function during social reflection may be associated with psychosis, dysfunction of default network regions, including the lateral temporal cortex (Brüne et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011) and midline cortical structures (MPFC and PCC) (Brunet et al., 2003; Holt et al., 2011a; Russell et al., 2000; Blackwood et al., 2004) has been observed during reflection on the self and others in schizophrenia. Links between functional or structural abnormalities of regions of this network and the presence or severity of delusions, have also been reported (Blackwood et al., 2004; Menon et al., 2011; Rotarsk-Jagiela et al., 2010; Takahashi et al., 2009) . Specifically, previous investigations of the neural correlates of delusions or psychotic symptoms in general have found evidence for both 1) state-related overactivity of limbic and default mode circuitry (RotarskaJagiela et al., 2010; Menon et al., 2011; Honey et al., 2008) , e.g., delusional thoughts and associated neural activity may be elicited by ambiguous (Holt et al., 2011b; Surguladze et al., 2006) or threatening (Taylor et al., 2007) information, as well as 2) impaired recruitment of medial frontal (Blackwood et al., 2004; Brüne et al., 2008; Holt et al., 2012) and temporal (Han et al., 2007) cortex during social, emotional or language processing. These prior studies suggest that in delusional states, disinhibition of circuits involved in socioemotional perception may interfere with their task-dependent functioning, perhaps particularly during emotional and social perception.
Given these findings and the associations previously found between delusions and social reflection deficits, one remaining important question is whether delusional thinking is associated with a specific pattern of neural activity during social reflective processing. To examine this question, in the current investigation we measured the relationship between the severity of delusional thinking in healthy subjects and default network responses during social reflection.
Taking a dimensional approach to studying neural correlates of delusional thinking in a nonclinical population allowed us to avoid the potential confounds of illness chronicity, medication effects, and institutionalization that commonly influence the study of delusions in patients with psychotic disorders (Claridge, 1987) . In addition, we conducted a secondary analysis to determine whether region(s) showing associations between social reflection-related responses and delusions also exhibit changes in resting-state functional connectivity. Resting-state fluctuations in the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal are thought to provide a measure of the default network's intrinsic (i.e., state and task-independent) functional organization (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012) . Since the degree of resting-state functional coupling among default network structures may reflect, at least in part, the strength of the anatomical connections between them (Andrews- Hanna et al., 2010; Buckner et al., 2008; Greicius et al., 2009) , abnormalities in resting-state coupling strength within the default network in delusional people would provide evidence for persistent alterations of those pathways in delusions.
We employed a well-validated fMRI paradigm used in previous studies in schizophrenia (Holt et al., 2011a) , in which subjects evaluate the degree to which trait adjectives describe themselves or a close other (Kelley et al., 2002; Schmitz et al., 2004; van der Meer et al., 2010) .
Subclinical delusional thinking was measured using the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI) (Peters et al., 1999) . The PDI is a validated measure of delusional ideation in nonclinical subjects that shows strong correlations with standard measures of schizotypy (Peters et al., 1999) and of other subthreshold psychotic symptoms (e.g., hallucinatory experiences) (Larøri & van der Linden, 2005) , and differentiates patients with psychotic disorders from healthy subjects (Scott et al, 2009; Schürhoff et al., 2003) . Based on the evidence for abnormal function and connectivity of default network regions in schizophrenia (Holt et al., 2011a; Murphy et al., 2010; WhitfieldGabrieli et al., 2009 ) and clinical delusions (Blackwood et al., 2004; Brüne et al., 2008) , we hypothesized that delusional thinking in non-clinical subjects would be associated with similar abnormalities of this network.
Methods and Materials

Participants
Twenty-two right-handed, native English speaking subjects (14 men and 8 women) without psychiatric disorders, as determined by the SCID (Frist et al., 2002) , were recruited via advertisement and enrolled in the study. Subjects with neurological disorders, serious medical illnesses, substance abuse or dependence, and subjects with contraindications for MRI scanning (Uttl, 2002) of 111.8 (S.D. = 7.3). One subject did not have a full resting BOLD scan due to early scan termination and was excluded form the resting functional connectivity analysis. Behavioral response times were not recorded for one subject due to equipment failure. A different analysis of a portion of this dataset (16 of the 22 subjects) was included in a previous publication (Holt et al., 2011a) .
Clinical Measures
The PDI is a 40-item measure of common delusional beliefs (e.g., Do you ever feel as if other people are talking about you behind your back?), rated on a 0 ("no") to 1 ("yes") point scale. Levels of anxiety and depression were measured using the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970) ) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI (Beck & Steer, 1987) ).
Stimulus Presentation and Task
The stimuli set of 144 words (trait adjectives, e.g., aimless, unenthusiastic, studious, mature) was divided into four lists of 36 words. The lists consisted of an equal number of positively and negatively-valenced adjectives (Anderson, 1968) , half printed in upper case and half in lower case letters. The word lists were matched for mean word length, word frequency, and valence. During the functional runs, subjects were asked to make judgments about the words, presented one at a time, in four conditions: 1) "does this word describe you?" (Self (S));
2) "does this word describe your mother?" (Other (O)); 3) "is this a desirable trait?" (Affect Labeling (AL)), which involves judging and then labeling the affective valence (positive versus negative) of the word; 4) "is this word printed in upper or lower case letters?" (Perceptual (P)).
For each subject, all 144 words were viewed during the experiment and one of the four word lists was assigned to each of the four conditions. The pattern of assignment of word lists to particular conditions was counterbalanced across subjects. Each word was viewed for 3 seconds in 18-second blocks (6 words per block; 2 blocks per condition) over three functional runs. Each block was preceded by an instruction screen viewed for 3 seconds, and each block was followed by a 21 second fixation period. Subjects registered their "yes" or "no" responses by pressing a button with the index finger of their right or left hand. The run order and the use of the right or left hand for particular responses were counterbalanced across subjects.
MRI Data Acquisition
MRI data was acquired using a 3-Tesla Siemens TIM Trio magnetic resonance scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, Iselin, New Jersey). Functional imaging was preceded by the collection of a high-resolution, three-dimensional structural T1 magnetization prepared rapid acquisition gradient-echo (MPRAGE) scan (8 min 7 seconds, 129 sagittal slices, 1.33-mm thickness, repetition time (TR) = 2530 msec, echo time = 3.39 msec, flip angle = 7°, resolution = 1.3 x 1 x 1.3 mm). Then T2 * -weighted echo-planar images were acquired (33 x 3mm thick slices, 3 x 3 mm in-plane resolution) during three 6-minute and 9-second functional runs, using a gradient-echo sequence (TR = 3000 msec; TE = 30 msec; flip angle = 90°). A 6-minute and 20-second resting BOLD scan (TR = 5000 msec; TE = 30msec; flip angle = 90°; 55 x 2 mm thick slices, 2 x 2 mm in-plane resolution) was also acquired. During the resting scan, subjects viewed a cross in the center of a gray screen and were instructed to fixate on the cross and to think about whatever they liked.
MRI Data Analysis
Preprocessing. Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed using the FreeSurfer Functional Analysis Stream (FS-FAST) (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). Functional volumes were motion corrected using the Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) algorithm, corrected for temporal drift, normalized for signal intensity, and then global intensity variations were removed. Normalized data were spatially smoothed (full width at half maximum = 6 mm) using a three-dimensional spatial filter. The individual cortical surface of each subject was morphed onto an average spherical surface representation to facilitate intersubject averaging of the functional data, which was carried out in a common spherical surface coordinate system using the General Linear Model with random effects.
Task-Based fMRI Analyses. For the primary contrast of interest, activation during SR (.5(S) + .5(O)) was compared to activation during AL. Activation for the SR > AL contrast is considered to reflect neural activity during social reflection because the SR tasks require a greater level of detail and depth of explicit representation of social information (i.e., of the self or a close other), compared to the AL task. Moreover, similar to previous studies (Moran et al., 2006; Schmitz et al., 2004) , we used AL as a baseline condition to control for the affective processing that occurs during the S and O tasks. In addition, to determine whether findings for the SR > AL contrast were driven primarily by activation during the S or O conditions, exploratory analyses were conducted using the contrasts S > AL and O > AL. Since the P task involved responding to questions with objectively correct answers, it served as an indicator of subjects' task engagement.
Because of previous findings of abnormal neural function in midline cortical structures during self-reflection (Holt et al., 2011a) and aberrant LTC activation during other-reflection (Murphy et al., 2010) in schizophrenia, we planned to measure average percent signal change, compared to a baseline average signal intensity, in three a priori regions of interest (ROIs) within the default network: MPFC, PCC, and LTC ( Figure 1A ). These ROIs were defined using an automated parcellation method (FreeSurfer (Fischl et al., 1999) ), which determines boundaries between cortical regions on the basis of known sulcal and gyral landmarks in each subject's anatomical scan (Desikan et al., 2006) . Percent signal change within these ROIs (SR or AL versus a low-level baseline (i.e., the mean BOLD signal intensity across all functional runs)) was measured and compared between conditions using a 2 (task: SR, AL) x 3 (region: MPFC, PCC, LTC), x 2 (hemisphere: left, right) analysis of variance. Significant effects were followed up by planned paired t-tests.
In addition, a secondary cortical surface based analysis (Fischl et al., 1999) was carried out in order to localize significant effects found in the ROI analysis. A Monte Carlo simulation (10,000 iterations, height threshold of p < .005) was used to identify significant clusters of activated voxels (corrected cluster-wise p < .05). The locations of peaks of activation were identified using FreeSurfer and confirmed with the Talairach atlas (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988 ).
Task-Based fMRI Activation and Symptom Analyses
Means and standard deviations for symptom data (total scores for the PDI, STAI, BDI questionnaires) were calculated. Kolmogorov-Smirnov testing showed a normal distribution for PDI, STAI and percent signal change during SR, but not for BDI. Thus, correlations between fMRI data, PDI, and STAI were tested with Pearson's correlation coefficient (r), whereas correlations involving BDI scores were calculated with Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (r s ). To constrain the examination of our primary hypothesis to brain areas showing the most robust differential response during social reflection, we limited this analysis to regions showing significant effects in the ROI analysis and significant cortical surface activation for the SR > AL contrast. For these correlations, α was set at .05, after a Bonferroni correction was applied for the number of regions examined. Since all other correlations conducted were exploratory in nature, uncorrected p values are reported for those analyses.
Resting-State Functional Connectivity Analysis
Conventional preprocessing techniques (Buckner et al., 2009 ) involved realignment and normalization to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates and temporal filtering to isolate low frequency (< .08 Hz) BOLD signal fluctuations. Images were corrected for spatial drift, temporal variance, and other potential causes of nonspecific variance using nuisance regressors that included: the six parameters computed from the rigid-body motion correction, the averaged signal within a ventricular region-of-interest, a region within the deep white matter, and the signal averaged over the whole brain. A seed based analysis was performed by constructing a 4 mm radius sphere around the voxel showing the strongest relationship between SR-related activity and delusional thinking (see Results). Group averaging was performed on Fisher z transforms (Zar, 1996) using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Loci exhibiting positive or negative correlations with the seed were considered significant if they met a voxel-level height threshold of p < .005 and a whole brain cluster-corrected threshold of p < .05. In addition, exploratory whole brain analyses using PDI total score or percent signal change during SR as a regressor were conducted. These regression analyses were limited to regions showing significant (p < .05) positive functional connectivity with the seed (negative correlations were excluded).
Correlations meeting a height threshold of p < .01 with an extent threshold of 25 voxels are reported.
Results
Symptoms
Mean levels of delusional thinking (3.2 ± 3.4; range: 0-10), state anxiety (29.2 ± 6.6; range: 20-26), trait anxiety (31.1 ± 7.4; range: 22-26), and depression (1.9 ± 3.7; range: 0-14) (measured using the PDI, STAI, and BDI, respectively) were typical of those previously reported for healthy samples (Peters et al., 1999; Beck et al., 1988; Knight et al., 1983) . Consistent with prior evidence linking delusional thinking and anxiety (Freeman, 2006) , a significant correlation between levels of delusional thinking and trait anxiety was found (r = .51, p = .02).
Behavior
On average, 49.1% of the words seen during the S task were endorsed as "like self"; 47.6% of the words seen during the O task were endorsed as "like other"; and 48.1% of the words seen during the AL task were endorsed as "desirable." Subjects showed high levels of accuracy during the P task (98.5% ± 2%), indicating good attentional engagement. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition for subjects' speed of responses F (2, 40) = 9.015, p = .001. Post hoc paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction showed that response times during O (1.51 ± .23 seconds) were significantly greater than during S (1.42 ± .21 seconds; t = -2.73; df = 20; p = .04) and AL (1.37 ± .20 seconds; t = 3.9; df = 20; p = .002). There were no significant differences between response times during S and AL (t = 1.6; df = 20; p = .39).
Task-Related BOLD Responses
In the ROI analysis (Table 1) Although the responses of the right LTC during SR compared to AL did not reach cluster-wise significance, an exploratory analysis revealed that the right LTC SR response was also negatively correlated with delusional thinking (r = -.47, p = .03, uncorrected). In contrast, there were no significant correlations between levels of delusional thinking and the magnitude of SRrelated responses of the MPFC or PCC bilaterally, nor were there significant associations between AL-related responses of any of the a priori ROIs and levels of delusional thinking.
Exploratory Analyses of Additional Contrasts
For both the S > AL and O > AL contrasts, there was significantly greater activation of the MPFC and PCC bilaterally, and the left LTC, similar to the pattern seen for the SR > AL contrast (Table 2B- 
Resting-State BOLD Activity Correlations
We followed up our main finding -a negative correlation between SR-related responses of the left LTC and delusional thinking --by testing whether this LTC region also showed aberrant functional coupling within the default network in association with delusional thinking.
To examine this, a seed-based functional connectivity analysis was conducted, using a spherical Table 3A) .
A whole brain analysis using PDI total score as a regressor revealed that delusional thinking was negatively correlated with the strength of functional connectivity between the left LTC and left MPFC (z = 2.86; p = .002) ( Figure 3A -B, Table 3Bi ) and also showed positive correlations with the connectivity between the left LTC and the right dorsal middle frontal gyrus (z = 2.96; p = .001) and right inferior temporal gyrus (z = 3.90; p = 5x10 -5 ) (Table 3Bi) .
A second whole brain analysis, using left LTC response during SR as a regressor, revealed that the magnitude of left LTC responses during SR was positively correlated with the strength of the connectivity between the left LTC and default network regions including, the left MPFC (z = 4.01; p = .3x10 -5 ( Figure 3C-D) , PCC, and inferior parietal cortex (Table 3Bii) .
Lastly, there were negative correlations between left LTC responses during SR and the connectivity between the left LTC and right temporal cortices.
Discussion
Summary of Findings
Here we found that in a sample of healthy subjects, a greater level of delusional thinking was associated with lower responses of the left LTC during reflection on the self and others Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) , our results suggest that reduced input to this region from frontal cortical areas could lead to errors in the attribution of intentions during social interactions, which could give rise to delusions. Increased coupling between the left LTC and right dorsal frontal and inferior temporal cortices in delusional thinking may, in turn, represent a compensatory response to the reductions in activity and connectivity described above. Overall, these results suggest that attenuated activity and aberrant connectivity of a lateral temporalmedial frontal network are associated with delusional thinking in healthy subjects.
Relationship to Previous Findings
Previous studies have found links between abnormalities in the function or size of temporal lobe structures and the presence or severity of delusions or symptoms of psychosis in general (Liddle et al., 1992; Kaplan et al., 1993; Rotarsk-Jagiela et al., 2010; Silbersweig et al., 1995; Takahashi et al., 2009) . For example, Takahashi and colleagues showed that progressive gray matter volume reduction of the left superior temporal sulcus was associated with increased severity of delusions during first episode psychosis, as well as with greater risk of transitioning to psychosis in clinical high-risk individuals (Takahashi et al., 2009) . Other studies have linked delusions in schizophrenia or schizotypy and abnormalities in the function of other default network regions, including the MPFC (Menon et al., 2011; Modinos et al., 2010; Modinos et al., 2011) and PCC (Holt et al., 2011b) . Overall, this prior work and the current study are consistent with the possibility that default network function is disrupted in individuals prone to or actively experiencing delusions. Moreover, the evidence linking aberrant default network responses with delusions in schizophrenia, and our findings of reduced activity in the same network in association with delusional beliefs in healthy subjects, support the hypothesis that delusional thinking in the general population is on a neurobiological continuum with clinical delusions.
Interpretation of our findings is limited by the fact that we measured delusions via selfreport. Thus, it is possible that delusional thinking was under-reported among our participants.
However, while conducting semi-structured interviews may have enhanced our assessment of delusional thinking, the PDI has reliably distinguished patients with psychotic disorders from healthy subjects (Scott et al, 2009; Schürhoff et al., 2003) , suggesting that it is a valid measure of delusion-like beliefs. Future studies measuring delusional thinking using several different methods, including interviews, are needed to confirm these initial findings.
The Role of the Lateral Temporal Cortex in Social Cognition
In healthy subjects, neuroimaging studies have shown that the LTC is reliably recruited during a wide range of social cognitive processes, such as theory of mind (Brüne et al., 2008; Russel et al., 2000; Calder et al., 2002; Goel et al., 1995; Perner et al., 2006) , empathy (Völlm et al., 2006) , and face recognition (Kircher et al., 2001; Platek et al., 2006) , and self and other processing ("social reflection") (Svodoba et al., 2006; Saxe et al., 2006) . While previous studies frequently report MPFC activity during tasks requiring self-awareness and self-referential processing (Frith & Frith, 2012; Heatherton, 2011; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004) , activity within the LTC has been most commonly seen during tasks requiring subjects to judge mental states and attributes of others (Hein & Knight, 2008; Lou et al., 2004) . Whether there are networks specific to self or other processing, however, is a subject of ongoing debate (Denny et al., 2012; Happé, 2003; Lou et al., 2004) . According to simulation models of social perception, self-reflection may serve as the basis for inferring attributes and intentions of others. Thus, the networks mediating these seemingly distinct mental processes may be overlapping (Tamir & Mitchell, 2010) . We found that LTC responses during self and other-reflection were both negatively correlated with levels of delusional thinking. Follow-up studies employing an event-related design (with behavioral measurements indicating the degree of self or other relevance of stimuli) will be needed to test whether delusional thinking is more closely related to disrupted processing of self or other-relevant information, or whether both are affected.
Other Models of Delusions
Studies of the cognitive basis of delusions have found abnormalities in associative learning and memory processes in delusional patients (Romaniuk et al., 2010; Corlett et al., 2007b; Holt et al., 2012) . These abnormalities may give rise to delusions via inappropriate "prediction error" signaling (i.e., signaling that there is an environmental stimulus that violates one's expectations) (Corlett et al., 2006; Corlett et al., 2007b) or an inability to retrieve a "safety signal" (a fear extinction memory) in a context-appropriate manner (Holt et al., 2012) . These data suggest that people with deficits in the associative memory processes supporting emotional/salience processing may be more vulnerable to delusions. However, these data do not account for a key phenomenological feature of many delusional beliefs -that they tend to involve social themes, rather than random events. One possibility is that associative memory abnormalities in delusions may be particularly disruptive of social cognitive processes. Future studies examining associative memory processes and social perception in the same subjects will shed further light on this issue.
Clinical Implications and Future Directions
These Average percentage (%) signal change during the social reflection (SR) and affect labeling (AL)
tasks, relative to a mean blood oxygen level-dependent signal intensity baseline, was extracted from the three anatomical ROIs, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and lateral temporal cortex (LTC). An analysis of variance showed a significant Region by Task interaction (see Results). Significantly greater responses during SR compared to AL were found in all three anatomical ROIs (n = 22), p <.05).
L, left; R, right. 
